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Abstract
This study addresses three questions: how Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) following the post-election violence of 2007/2008 in Kenya 
are recreating their community resilience capacities; how the Kenyan 
government and non-state interventions are inf luencing the victims’ 
livelihood strategies towards their reconstruction and recovery process and 
how social support and social capital have accelerated their reconstruction 
and recovery process. The study adopted qualitative research methodology, 
and primary data were collected since January 2015, continuously and 
concurrently with data analysis. The key finding was that ownership of land 
is identified and perceived as a milestone in the process of post-conf lict 
reconstruction and recovery, and as an avenue for community resilience. 
The study found that after the rather short-term programmes of the Kenyan 
government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and
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Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), the main means of livelihood 
for IDPs still is casual labour and other menial jobs. However, many IDPs, 
especially those who were not placed in camps or resettled on farms, but 
integrated with host communities, developed new emergent norms to 
support each other. The key recommendations are that government should 
evaluate the economic loss of every integrated IDP, and that those resettled 
in government procured farms should be provided with legal ownership 
documents. There should be an urgent re-profiling of IDPs in camps and 
a definite commitment to follow the United Nations’ Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 2004). The findings of this study bring to light new knowledge on 
the theory of social capital. It shows how victims of displacement develop 
new emergent norms, values and culture to support each other, which 
eventually creates a new society/community.
Keywords: Internally displaced persons, Kenya, post-conflict reconstruction 
and recovery, livelihood strategies, social capital, community resilience
1. Kenya’s genie of tribal politics
The post-election crisis of January 2008 brought Kenya close to collapse. 
The abrupt proclamation of Mwai Kibaki, the retired president, as victor 
in a highly contentious presidential election, led to either planned or 
spontaneous eruptions of ethnic violence (see Kagwanja 2009:365–387). 
According to an investigative report on 2007/2008 post-election violence, 
popularly referred to as the Waki Commission 2008 report, there are 
several deep-rooted causes of the post-election violence, such as poverty 
and unemployment, but ethnic disputes relating to land and dating back 
to colonial times (notably between Kalenjin and Kikuyu in the Rift Valley) 
and the formation of political parties around Kenya’s 42 ethnic groups 
were the immediate causes of the violence (Akiwumi Report 1999; Waki 
Commission 2008; Kagwanja 2009). 
Towards the election date, ethnic tension was further heightened by the 
opposition campaign, critically shaped by the rhetoric of ‘forty one against 
117
Community resilience and social capital
one’ (the Kikuyu) and ‘Kenya against Kikuyu’. The message to the voters 
was to isolate one tribe (Kikuyu) against the other forty one tribes in 
Kenya by voting as a tribal bloc. This demonstrated that though multiparty 
elections in 1992, 1997 and 2002 were also conducted along ethnic lines, 
ethnic polarisation reached fever pitch in the 2007 elections. According to 
the Waki Commission (2008) and Adeagbo (2011:174–179), deep-rooted 
land disputes, economic and political inequality, impunity, the role of the 
media, and ethnic animosity played a key role in the post-election violence. 
At independence, Kenya had only two parties: Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU 
was dominated by the Kikuyu ethnic tribe and KADU by the Luo ethnic 
tribe. At Independence, the country still had adequate levels of economic 
resources, and the perception of ethnicity was not evident. Politicians 
conducted politics around national identity, and thus candidates were 
voted for regardless of ethnicity. However, from the 1990s multiparty 
period in Kenya, ambitious politicians discovered they could win votes by 
appealing for ethnic support and promising improved government services 
and projects in their areas. They created an ethnic solidarity, enhanced 
perceptions of ethnic favouritism, and to some extent caused increased 
post-election violence (see Kagwanja 2009; Kagwanja and Southall 2009; 
Kanyinga 2009; Waki Commission 2008; Akiwumi Report 1999; Kiliku 
Commission 1992; Kiai 2008:162–168).
Tribal identity, kinship, and clan or ethnic considerations largely 
determined how people voted henceforth, and especially in the 2007 
general elections (Waki Commission 2008). This means ethnicity has been 
one of the significant variables under Kenya’s multiparty democracy, since 
competition for state resources has made it hard for politicians to devise 
alternative bases for political organisation such as class (Kwatemba 2012). 
Hyden (2006) acknowledges this point when he argues that the inf luence 
of ‘community-centred networks’ in African politics has been due to the 
inability of class-based identity to dislodge kinship ties.
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At the continental level, the re-introduction of multiparty politics in the 
early 1990s led to a worrying trend of increasing election-related violent 
conf lict that threatens democracy, peace and stability. These threats are 
manifested through increased electoral violence with an ethnic dimension. 
According to Kagwanja (2009:365–387), the electoral violence in Kenya 
quickly metamorphosed into a deadly orgy of ‘ethnic’ slaughter, rape and 
plunder reminiscent of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, about which Wolff 
(2006:31) notes:
Ethnicity acquires enormous power to mobilize people when it becomes a 
predominant identity and means more than just a particular ethnic origin; 
it comes to define people as speakers of a certain language, belonging to 
a particular religion, being able to pursue some careers but not others, 
being able to preserve and express their cultural heritage, having access to 
positions of power and wealth or not. In short, when ethnicity becomes 
politically relevant and determines the life prospects of people belonging to 
distinct ethnic groups, it is possible to mobilize group members to change 
a situation of apparently perpetual discrimination and disadvantage or in 
defence of a valued status quo.
In Kenya today, ethnicity has become more than just an expression of 
cultural identity: it gets connected to social status; it determines people’s 
fortunes in life and becomes politicised. It makes it possible for those who 
feel aggrieved as a result of discrimination and those in power who want 
to protect their privileges, to invoke ethnicity (Kwatemba 2008; 2012). 
This elicits a sense of optimism due to wide participation, but increases 
cases of electoral violence in a country like Kenya with forty two ethnic 
groups. Indeed, the 2007/2008 post-election violence proved the weaknesses 
of many electoral institutions since independence (Khadiagala 2008:53–60; 
Waki Commission 2008; Abuya 2009:127–158).
With the ethnic and electoral institutional challenges during every election, 
Kenya’s political history has become very dynamic and unpredictable. 
For example, the country promulgated a new constitution in 2010 and 
conducted peaceful 2013 elections – although the presidential results were 
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contested at the Supreme Court. The court upheld the results in its 
30 March 2013 ruling. Though Raila Odinga and the elected opposition 
leaders criticised the casual way in which this ruling was made, they 
nevertheless accepted the outcome. The 2017 general election was peaceful, 
but the presidential election results were again contested at the Supreme 
Court. This time the court, in its 1 September 2017 ruling, annulled the 
results and ordered a second vote. This was conducted against the backdrop 
of a boycott by Raila Odinga (Daily Nation 2017d; Standard 2017).
To a large extent the opposition stronghold never participated, but only 
called for mass protests and economic boycotts. Indeed on 30 January 
2018, Odinga took an oath at a public rally in Uhuru Park and was ‘sworn 
in’ as the people’s president. But on 9 March 2018 he decided to support 
Kenyatta’s government leaving his supporters and government leadership 
surprised by the move popularly referred to as ‘handshake’. He termed 
the cross-over a Building Bridges Initiative. On 20 October 2018 he was 
appointed African Envoy for Infrastructure Development by the Chairman 
of the African Union. This adaptive transformation of Odinga has led 
political commentators to question if he will vie for the presidency in the 
2022 general election, with this new mandate and also his advancing age 
(Daily Nation 2018).
2. The scale and impact of internal displacement
The post-election violence led to the death of 1 133 people and the displace-
ment of over 600 000 (Waki Commission 2008). At the end, there were 118 
IDP camps across the country (Waki Commission 2008). According to 
the global survey of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2011), 
40.8 million people around the world have been forced by armed conflict 
and generalised violence to flee their homes, and were living in displacement 
within the borders of their own country at the end of 2015. This is the largest 
number in the last ten years. In 2014, there were 38 million people displaced, 
33.3 million in 2013, 28.8 million in 2012, 26.6 million in 2011, 27.5 million 
in 2010, 27 million in 2009 and 26 million in 2008. 
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In sub-Saharan Africa, there were 12 million IDPs across 22 countries, 
with Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Somalia and 
Nigeria being the most affected. By the end of 2015, Kenya accounted for 
309 200 people living in internal displacement. These statistics, and those 
of previous years, show that internal displacement is a problem which is 
increasing each year, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
During the violence in Kenya, IDPs lost community support structures 
which members of the community had helped build in their lifetime. Many 
self-employed community members lost business income and livelihood, 
while those in gainful employment lost their jobs. Social networks such as 
families, neighbours, friends, co-workers as well as informal social support 
mechanisms were destroyed. Although some of the above community 
social structures were reconstructed, many were not, and others were 
entirely abandoned as community members became resettled in new areas.
Social capital, defined as the capacity of individuals to command scarce 
socio-economic and political resources by virtue of belonging to a social 
network (Portes 1998; 2000; Nakagawa and Shaw 2004) was disrupted 
or destroyed. Many families remained separated, and informal support 
systems such as women credit systems, record keeping and micro-finance 
banking structures were disorganised and damaged. This has prevented 
social capital from playing its crucial role in the process of reconstruction 
and recovery. Research in social psychology has revealed that the primary 
source of help and social support for IDPs is their own informal social 
support networks (Hernandez-Plaza et al. 2006:1151–1169). 
Although some of the IDPs have been resettled in new areas by the 
government, it has been difficult for them to recover their socio-economic 
livelihood, which had been previously achieved through applying the 
unique adaptation, absorption or transformation coping strategies of social 
support (Alvarez-Castillo et al. 2006:78–87). The process of reconstruction 
and recovery spearheaded by the Kenyan government and non-state actors 
is on-going, but many IDPs are yet to bounce back resiliently to their pre-
conf lict situation. The government’s approach is costly, but merely ad hoc 
and ineffective (Daily Nation 2017c). 
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The hope that IDPs were to receive reparation and either restorative or 
retributive justice, in order to bounce back by adapting, being absorbed or 
transforming, was short-lived as the Kenyan parliament referred the post-
election violence cases to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC 
commenced pre-trial hearings for crimes against humanity by six Kenyans – 
Uhuru Kenyatta, Francis Muthaura, Hussein Ali, William Ruto, Henry 
Kosgey and Joshua Sang – and recommended prosecution for being most 
culpable for the violence. By 2016, however, all the cases had collapsed. 
Successful prosecution would have paved way for secondary cases with 
regard to compensation for the IDPs.
The ICC pre-trial hearings became complicated when in 2013 two of the 
suspects, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were elected president and 
deputy president respectively, which brought to light the question of the 
Kenyan government’s degree of co-operation with the ICC. To date, Kenya 
has not established any internationally recognised justice system to try any 
emerging cases related to the post-election violence, and nobody has been 
successfully tried and convicted of such crimes (ICC 2009; 2015).
While various processes have been applied in the management of the 
post-election violence, such as national intelligence gathering, security 
mapping, early warning and response, preparedness, prevention and 
mitigation (Kumar 1997; Krisch and Flint 2011; Alexander 2002; Coppola 
2007), the resettlement of IDPs, part of the reconstruction and recovery 
process, stopped in 2012 (Daily Nation 2015b; 2016b; 2015c; Standard 2015). 
This was the period coinciding with the end of the term of the 
coalition government and the ushering in of campaigns for another 
general election in March 2013. But during the 2017 general election 
campaigns, President Kenyatta allocated an amount of Kenyan Shillings 
(Kshs.) 358 million as compensation to Integrated IDPs in Kisii, Nyamira 
(Daily Nation 2017b; 2017a). Still, when it was stopped in 2012, the 
reconstruction and recovery process of IDPs was yet to be fully completed.
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3. Research design and methodology
To understand how the various interventions assisted or limited community 
resilience of IDPs, the researcher used Interview-Guides, Focus Group 
Discussions, Key Informant interviews and Review of secondary data as 
tools to collect data.
Interviews for camp-based IDPs were limited to Kamara IDPs camp in 
Kuresoi North District, Nakuru County, and Mumoi IDPs camp in Subukia 
District, Nakuru County. These two camps were picked as they are the 
oldest and hence have a rich history of IDPs issues and also hold the largest 
number of IDPs. Ten respondents were picked – five from each of the two 
camps. The first five adult IDPs were picked from the Ministry of State for 
Special Programmes lists of the two camps.
Interviews for government-resettled IDPs were limited to five areas: Muhu 
Farm in Mirangini District, Nyandarua County; Ngiwa Farm in Rongai 
District, Nakuru County; Kabia/Asanyo Farm, in Kuresoi North District, 
Nakuru County; Gakonya Farm in Molo District, Nakuru County; Haji 
Farm in Subukia District, Nakuru County. These five out of the current 
eighteen farms for government-resettled IDPs (part of about 28 government-
procured farms) were picked deliberately because of their large numbers 
and long histories.
From each farm’s list, as maintained by the Ministry of State for Special 
Programmes, the researcher picked three respondents, taking every fifth 
name. In this category there were therefore fifteen respondents.
Interviews for integrated IDPs were conducted in Ndunduri in Mirangini 
District, Nyandarua County, Bahati Centre in Nakuru District, Nakuru 
County, and in Nakuru Township in Nakuru District, Nakuru County. 
These are the areas with the largest number of integrated IDPs country-
wide. Nine respondents were picked in the same way as in the previous 
case.
To check on the validity and reliability of data from the primary respondents, 
key informant interviews and focused group discussions were conducted, 
and relevant reports and documents were reviewed. The key informants 
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included: the programme co-coordinator for IDPs resettlement in the 
Ministry of State for Special Programmes; the programme co-coordinator 
for IDPs affairs in the Integration and Cohesion Commission; the 2007/2008 
post-election violence IDP Network Leader; the programme co-ordinator 
for Kenya Red Cross Society, IDPs reconstruction and recovery programme; 
one local chief each within the two main IDP camps; and one Member of 
Country Assembly representatives from each of the two main IDP camps.
Six IDPs were considered for the focus group discussion in each of the 
three categories of IDPs. Individuals for the focus group discussions were 
picked through purposive sampling based on their perceived knowledge 
of the themes under discussion. Three focus group discussions were 
conducted with, in each case, two men, two women and two youths picked 
from the relevant list of the Ministry of State for Special Programmes 
– camp-based IDPs, government-resettled IDPs and integrated IDPs. 
The researcher created groups that were balanced according to age and 
gender. The discussions were scheduled for about forty-five to sixty 
minutes. The researcher used personal and professional attributes to create 
a conducive environment for optimum input on topics under discussion.
Additionally, to cross-check for details given in other techniques, this 
research reviewed: school admission/enrolment registers for the two main 
schools concerned; programme budgets from local NGOs implementing 
post-election violence projects; progress reports from Kenya Red Cross 
Society; progress reports from the Ministry of State for Special Programmes; 
and progress reports from the Cohesion and Integration Commission. 
Such records are presumed to be as objective and unaffected by emotions 
as possible.
The fieldwork provided answers on livelihood capacities and on the role 
of land in community resilience, as well as on the roles of social support, 
the ICC, and the Kenyan State and other actors. The purpose was to 
reveal ‘what works and what does not work’. Together with the fieldwork 
component, however, the study intended to unpack the empirical, 
theoretical and conceptual contributions of new knowledge to the post-




It became clear that means of livelihood and ownership of resources, especially 
land, played a key role in the reconstruction and recovery of the IDPs.
4.1 Land ownership
Legal ownership of land is identified and perceived by IDPs as a socio-
economic asset to their reconstruction and recovery, making it the 
backbone of community resilience. Land ownership was linked throughout 
by respondents as the avenue for more successful recovery. Government 
made an effort towards the resettlement of IDPs on parcels of land, but 
never provided legal titles. These parcels can therefore not serve as a safety 
net (absorptive capacities), and the IDPs cannot actively engage in changing 
land policies (transformative capacities). Lack of legal ownership denies 
IDPs an asset and a means of long-term recovery. This was explained thus:
We are told the land is ours, the house is ours … but we don’t have the title. 
We are not 100% sure of tomorrow in case of violence. But at least we have 
something. If it was possible we would borrow money with these (land and 
house) as surety, but no bank or co-surety would agree an arrangement 
without legal documents (Male, Kabia/Asanyo farm).
IDPs have no capacity for credit systems and cannot make alternative 
investment options, such as selling the land or building rental structures. 
IDPs continue to suffer the loss of economic growth, stable means 
of livelihood and equitable distribution of income and assets within 
populations. Land, raw materials, physical capital and accessible housing 
create the essential resource base for a resilient community. Land is so 
significant that even IDPs who never owned land before the violence 
looked forward to owning a piece by courtesy of the ad hoc and ineffective 
resettlement process. It would help the victims to rebuild a base for their 
socio-economic lives by building up income and assets. Also, if the land 
is fertile, and there are houses, water, roads, electricity and other physical 
infrastructure, its market value would increase further. As a community 
asset it can help creating diverse kinds of socio-economic livelihood for 
legal owners.
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After the violence, the government developed a resettlement framework 
such that an IDP was to be allocated 2¼ hectares of land, of which the ¼ 
hectare was to be used for building a house, while the 2 hectares were to 
be used for farming. Seeds and fertilizer for the first planting season were 
also provided. Such a piece of land, barely equivalent to the land individual 
IDPs had lost, is not adequate for profitable farming. The resettled have 
to depend on seasonal rain for cultivating maize and beans, but the rain 
is unpredictable in volumes and patterns. Season by season, the harvests 
continue to be poor as the IDPs have no capacity to invest in modern 
farming technologies or budget for fertilizer or manure. And without 
enough food, IDPs cannot be resilient. They explained:
Each one of us was allocated 2¼ hectares, each house is built on a ¼ hectare 
while each household farms the remaining 2 hectares (Female, Ngiwa farm).
We owned big chunks of land back at home, here we were allocated 2 
hectares each … how much food can one grow in that piece? It cannot 
even feed the entire family. One must look for other means of sustaining 
the family, hence casual labour to the host community (Male, Ngiwa farm).
By the end of this study, it was not possible to establish the actual number 
of IDPs resettled as there was no clear data on how many IDPs have been 
allocated farms. After allocations, the government discontinued any socio-
economic or political support. The argument has been that once resettled, 
victims cease being IDPs. However, the resettled continue to perceive 
themselves as IDPs and are identified as such by the host communities. 
This has hindered reconstruction and recovery as they continue to look 
forward for economic and social support from government and NGOs. 
In fact, they lament over how the government has not been visiting them 
in the resettlement. A key finding among camp-based IDPs is that due to 
the long stay in the camps, they have developed a ‘beggar culture’, which 
has continued to limit their view of opportunities. But in reality this study 
has found that these IDPs do not fit the definition of beggars. One of them 
captured their situation as follows:
… just idle around in the camp. There is nothing to do. We just sit talk 
whole day, waiting if one can get some casual labour in the field ... can wait 
for weeks or months (Male, Kamara camp).
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We have hope that one day we get paid what we lost. But for now we are at 
zero. I came here with nothing, having lost everything. When government 
gives us land and build houses for us like it has done to some other IDPs, 
is when we can look forward for a new beginning (Male, Kamara camp).
When they were asked about their means of livelihood and occupation, the 
majority gave the following kind of response:
 ... Casual labour … could be farming in the host community farms, 
domestic work in their houses, fetching water, washing clothes … any 
‘kibarua’ (casual labour) available. When you have nothing you cannot 
choose ... It is also not available all the time. For example, I have been out of 
any ‘kibarua’ for the last two weeks. If I am lucky I can be on ‘kibarua’ for a 
month, and also can be without for as long (Female, Kamara camp).
There were no adequate consultations between the IDPs and Government 
before resettlement. This is against the UN guiding principles on 
resettlement (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement 2006; 
Brookings Institution 2008; 2011). Government presumed that all IDPs were 
farmers or could be farmers even when they had previously been business 
people. This is manifested in the allocated farms where the idea of farming 
is abandoned and IDPs rent out part or all of the 2 hectares provided by the 
Government. They use the money for other socio-economic business ideas 
which they think may bring about resiliency. 
An interesting finding has been the claim that weather and climate in these 
farms are too extreme for any profitable livelihood. As such IDPs spend a 
lot of time hoping for alternatives which are unlikely to come. The land 
allocated is in isolated locations and in harsh climatic and environmental 
areas. IDPs perceive direct allocation of land by government or provision 
of cash to buy land on their own as the only avenue towards adaptation, 
absorption or transformation pathways. On weather an IDP said:
Here the weather is very harsh ... in the morning it is fog ... one old man 
died here because of the weather (Female, Muhu farm).
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4.2 Means of livelihood and external effort
Before the violence, IDPs’ assets included animals such as cows, sheep, 
goats, pigs and donkeys. They cultivated foodstuff such as maize, beans 
and peas for family consumption and sold the surplus, and they also had 
small businesses in townships. The pool of assets (animals, money saved, 
land, foodstuff, home structures etc.) acted as safety net for emergencies. 
They were able to acquire credit for emergencies from friends and structured 
financial institutions. They lived in a family set-up (wife/husband and 
children) and in community (neighbours, friends, co-workers).
Now, however, they are faced with limited opportunities and options for 
any economic livelihoods, which are also unsustainable – especially in the 
case of, for instance, casual labour (Jacobsen 2002). The social support 
system network of IDPs operates only amongst themselves, hence is 
economically weak. This is an emergent norm, similar to that of Colombian 
IDPs who relied on each other for social support (Zora 2009:133–151; 
Tardy 1985:187–202). Without external livelihood assistance, IDPs remain 
vulnerable for a long period of time – having lost their entire social support 
system provided by family, friends, neighbours, co-workers, professionals, 
norms, culture, values, institutions and more. 
Some IDPs have been able to create new social support through emergent 
norms, cultures and values. But these new social support systems have not 
helped to accelerate their reconstruction and recovery processes, especially 
among camp-based IDPs, as they are mostly concerned with voicing 
their vulnerability. They are mainly for emotional and informational 
purposes. They lack financial ability to support each other. For example, 
IDPs responded:
My brothers and sisters are struggling like me … they have their own 
families. It will even be a bother to ask for help from them. Our neighbours 
are also IDPs. It’s only government which can help us by giving us some 
land (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).
… even if they (family) wanted, maybe they send airtime. They cannot afford 
any other help. They are as needy as I am … (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).
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In the pyramid of social support, family, neighbours and colleagues are 
placed at the core (Tardy 1985). Support is either received (enacted) or 
perceived (expected). Various forms of social capital include bonding, 
bridging and linking, but for IDPs with their common vulnerability 
these are weak. To overcome this vulnerability they have developed a 
strong emergent norm, value and culture of assisting each other. They are 
continuously securing casual labour through referrals, they share common 
meals and sleep in one tent if need arises. This is regardless of ethnic 
affiliation or gender. They forget their ethnic affiliations, hence draw 
strength in their diversity. They are a close-knit community, which is a 
social support mechanism and a survival strategy. 
Social support helps IDPs to build adaptive capacities, create alternative 
livelihood strategies as well as absorptive capacity, and minimise shocks 
and stress. Portes (1998; 2000) has noted that dependency and reliance 
on other people is an advantage, hence the emergent norm of referral for 
opportunities among social network of IDPs.
There are cases where IDPs have cordial relationships with the host 
community, who are receptive to and supportive of their socio-economic 
needs. Because camp-based IDPs and Government resettled IDPs live in 
secluded IDPs-only areas, they have less contact with host communities 
than integrated IDPs who live together with host communities. All IDPs 
have access to National Government leadership, but through their elected 
leaders, such as Members of Parliament, Members of County Assemblies 
and Local Administration such as Chiefs. Additionally they have formed 
IDP leadership structures.
In addition to IDPs’ own efforts, agencies other than the State have 
also attempted to restore livelihood for the IDPs. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) implemented a livelihood project 
worth US$1 666 700. The aim of this project was to re-equip IDPs with 
lost livelihood assets, skills and micro-enterprise opportunities, as well 
as credit and entrepreneurial opportunities. This was done through 
establishing business solution centres in the major hubs, providing access 
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to women’s development funds and youth business funds, restoring and 
improving access to markets, rehabilitating small-scale public works 
through intensive labour, and mainstreaming livelihoods recovery in the 
national economic agenda (UNDP 2009; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c).
The UNDP project was not able to reach out to all IDPs, however, and other 
non-state actors such as the Kenya Red Cross, only offered humanitarian 
assistance. Their projects ended after the humanitarian crisis, and civil 
society was left with the accountability of remaining interested in advocacy 
and human rights issues. During the course of this study the Government 
announced a new initiative to resettle IDPs through a Kshs. 10 billion fund, 
thereby acknowledging that at that stage the process was still incomplete. 
By 2012 the Government had spent Kshs. 4 billion and NGOs 16 billion 
on post-conf lict reconstruction and recovery of the IDPs (Daily Nation 
2016a; 2017b; 2016c; Standard 2018; 2016). But eventually, apparently due 
to fatigue, the Government announced the closure of all IDP camps. 
NGOs shortly thereafter also closed down all their IDPs projects – perhaps 
because there was no more donor appeal. Currently NGOs are active in 
research, human rights and advocacy. The large amounts of money spent 
are not ref lective of the livelihood reconstruction and recovery of the IDPs 
(Kanyinga 2014).
By the end of this study there were 46 IDP camps, 28 government procured 
farms – of which only 18 were fully operational. The government was not 
able to provide the accurate number of integrated IDPs. However, 170 000 
integrated IDPs were each given Kshs. 10 000 as start-up capital. In the 
combined area of this study, covering Bahati, Ndunduri and Nakuru towns, 
there were 8 250 integrated IDPs (Ministry of State for Special Programmes 
2010; 2011; 2012).
Government paid Kshs. 25 000 to every returning IDP to reconstruct their 
houses and another Kshs. 10 000 as start-up capital. In this intervention, 
38 145 IDP households received payment. The target was to construct 
43 792 houses but Government managed to construct only 26 589. There 
were 817 individual IDPs who received Kshs. 400 000 to rebuild their own 
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houses without government logistical support and Kshs. 10 000 as start-up 
capital. A total of 617 primary schools were constructed in the affected 
areas (Ministry of State for Special Programmes 2010; 2011; 2012).
In addition to direct Government support, there was resource and monetary 
support from external actors. For example, the Government of China 
donated 105 000 iron sheets worth Kshs. 200 million, the government of 
Morocco donated US$1 million and Africa Development Bank (ADB) 
donated Kshs. 1.5 billion for farm infrastructure. When IDPs who f led 
to Uganda returned in 2015, UNHCR paid each IDP US$50. This was an 
indication of the recognition of these IDPs.
4.3 Unfulfilled expectations of a judicial solution
Kenya is part of the international community and a signatory of ICC 
Rome Statute, and as such the post-election violence cases were referred 
to the ICC through a formal and a systematic process (ICC 2009; 2015). 
However, the previous Government and the 2013–2017 Government were 
very pre-occupied fighting off the ICC to the detriment of the IDPs’ plight. 
The Government’s failure to establish a local tribunal and its opting for the 
Hague-based ICC demonstrated its unwillingness to engage in a process 
towards a permanent judicial solution for the victims (Daily Nation 2009; 
Daily Nation 2013a; Daily Nation 2013b). However, acquittals in the 
Kenyatta and Ruto ICC cases, in 2014 and 2016 respectively, re-programmed 
the vision and mission of the IDPs reconstruction and recovery agenda by 
the Government (Daily Nation 2015a).
The IDPs expected justice to be administered to the perpetrators of the 
violence. They were to be held accountable for the IDPs’ loss of their property, 
relatives and friends. A Post-Conf lict Reconstruction and Development 
(PCRD) programme could have provided for this, and victims expected to 
achieve restorative, reparative and retributive justice, but Kenya’s judicial 
system was unwilling and incapable (Khadiagala 2008:53–60; 2009:4–33; 
African Union 2006; 2009). 
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4.4 The expected role of the African Union
Although the African Union has the primary responsibility for peace 
and security (Murithi 2006; Nkhuhlu 2005), it failed to anticipate the 
magnitude of the violence in Kenya. It thus arrived on the ground late. 
Perhaps if Kofi Annan, the Panel of Eminent Persons’ chairman, had 
arrived earlier, the number of deaths and the amount of destruction and 
displacement would have been less and the reconstruction and recovery 
process would have been manageable (Khadiagala 2008:53–60; 2009:4–33). 
Western countries, such as the US, Germany, UK, France, and Switzerland, 
funded the mediation process through the African Union, and hence the 
peace process was neither African-based nor Kenyan-based despite the 
Panel of Eminent Persons being African. 
The African Union relied on the traditional approach of peace negotiations, 
ceasefire, transitional government, demilitarisation, constitutional 
reforms and democratic elections. The peace negotiations, however, 
through the AU approach were short-term – just to end the crisis. A long-
term post-conf lict reconstruction and recovery agenda was recommended, 
but enforcement mechanisms were not established. The agenda points 
developed by the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation body 
remained as such and at the mercy of political leadership to implement. 
Indeed, to end the crisis, the African Union did establish the Grand 
Coalition government of 2007–2013. This Government, for purposes of 
inclusivity was the largest since independence and had two centres of 
power, each faction answerable to either Kibaki or Odinga (Kenya National 
Dialogue and Reconciliation 2009).
A Special Session of the Assembly of the AU eventually, on 31 August 2009, 
passed action plans on the consideration and resolution of conf licts in 
Africa. At that stage, Kenya had just emerged from the violence, and was 
not among the thirteen countries in the action plans. What should have 
happened in Kenya, however, was to set up country offices such as in the 
Quick Impact Projects (QUIPS) approach as well as to provide funds to 
implement the reconstruction and recovery of socio-economic capacities 
of IDPs (Daley 2006:303–319; African Union 2009). 
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5. Recommended model for post-conflict reconstruction 
and recovery of IDPs
From the above findings, this study recommends an IDP post-election 
reconstruction and recovery approach. The approach suggests five 
coordinated steps:
First, it should be recognised that where democracy is mature, it is unlikely 
to have incidences of post-election violence in which the community 
experiences a crisis, people are displaced, killed and property destroyed, 
and the displaced seek shelter in camps, and become IDPs.
Secondly, the government department in charge of internal affairs should 
consult or cooperate with a lead non-state actor such as the UNDP who 
has experience and capacity to coordinate the humanitarian affairs of the 
displaced population. This lead agency should coordinate all other non-
state actors in the management of various IDP camps. Humanitarian 
resources should be distributed to the IDPs through the various non-state 
agencies with roles assigned by the appointed non-state actor. The core 
competencies and functions of these agencies should be established before 
assignment. The main activities of these non-state actors should include the 
supply of resources and essentials such as – food, clothes, tents, transport, 
counselling, medicines and tracing. 
Third, the Government should take the responsibility of profiling the IDPs 
in terms of socio-economic losses and capacities. This profiling should 
ultimately lead to comprehensive databases and databanks of genuine IDPs. 
The information on the databases can be verified against the documentation 
from the departments dealing with immigration, registration of persons, 
and issuance of identity documents. Government security agencies should 
also collect crucial information from IDPs regarding alleged perpetrators 
of the post-election violence. This information should be verified with 
information collected outside the camps.
The Government should be guided by the UN guiding principles for 
purposes of classifying IDPs in terms of returning home, re-integration 
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or resettlement options. Social support abilities of IDPs may be identified 
through interviews with IDPs to establish their primary social network, 
and their adaptation, absorption and transformation capacities according 
to an assessment of the skills, assets, information and communication, 
vision and mission of each IDP household.
Fourth, when a PCRD process is underway, the Government should attend 
to the implementation of the various legal frameworks such as the UN 
Guiding Principles, Kampala Convention, Great Lakes Convention and 
Kenya IDP Bill when IDPs are returned to their original homes, resettled 
elsewhere or helped to re-integrate within the communities. The most 
viable option would be to return IDPs to their original homes. Where this 
is impossible, however, the best would be to re-integrate them in the host 
communities.
The last step is to ensure that perpetrators of the post-election violence 
face the justice system. IDPs should receive compensation in the form of 
reparation, and should observe the administering of justice in the form 
of retribution or restitution. A trusted judicial system is able to hold the 
perpetrators of the post-election violence to account and make them pay 
for properties destroyed and deaths caused.
6. What works: Integrating IDPs as the better option
The integrated category of IDPs is able to recover from the violence and 
reconstruct their situation much faster than the other categories of IDPs. 
They are able to adapt, absorb and transform their IDP status and return to 
their businesses, hence becoming more resilient than camp and government-
resettled IDPs. They are able to go back to the host community or relocate 
to other parts of the country and re-start with their new lifestyles. 
The host communities are generally receptive and cordial to post-conf lict 
victims. There are strong social support systems within this integration of 
IDPs with the host communities as compared with the other IDPs. These 




Portes’ (1998; 2000) definition of social capital emphasises that a person 
must be related to others, and it is those others, not him-/herself, who are 
the actual source of his or her advantage. In this regard, integrated IDPs 
were able to re-establish their old social network. The primary source 
of help and social support for IDPs is their own informal social groups. 
This experience is similar to that of IDP victims elsewhere – for instance, 
Japan (after the Kobe earthquake), Azerbaijan, South-Western highlands 
of Uganda, Liberia, South Sudan (due to the 2013 ethnic violence) – and 
that of IDP-women in Bogota, Colombia (Brookings-Bern Project on 
Internal Displacement 2006; Brookings Institution 2008; 2011; Zora 2009). 
This demonstrates that social support provides an informal boost to the 
community resilience of IDPs. 
Integrated IDPs’ adaptive, absorptive and transformative capacities are 
strong because they do not only have their own IDP-based social support 
system; they have managed to integrate with the host community and have 
hence secured a broad social network for recovery and reconstruction. They 
have established cordial relationships with the landlords, who allowed 
them delayed rent re-payments of loans made in difficult circumstances. 
They have been able to integrate and conduct businesses with those who were 
not affected by the violence as well as to re-establish social networking with 
former business clients. The integrated nature of their resettled situation 
means they attend the same markets, churches and clinics as their host 
communities, and their children are in the same public schools. This study 
concludes that this is a valuable asset in their reconstruction and recovery. 
In addition to the social networks of their new environments, they have 
a type of leadership structure comprised of a chairperson, secretary and 
members. This social network helps them access information and also 
links them to the National Government. They have bonding, linking 
and bridging social capital, which is positively helping them accelerate 
their reconstruction and recovery. This empowers them for collective 
decision-making.
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7. Conclusions
The analysis on ‘what works and what does not work’ provides a lens for this 
study to offer four critical conclusions for policy makers in post-conf lict 
reconstruction and recovery. On the basis of the findings, the following 
conclusions and recommendations are presented: 
7.1 Land-based resettlement approach
Land-based post-conf lict reconstruction and recovery approaches on 
their own are not a sustainable solution for IDP community resiliency. 
IDPs require a guaranteed socio-economic livelihood. Post-electoral 
conf lict victims should be integrated back into communities and offered 
some socio-economic livelihood they can rely on (Brookings-Bern Project 
on Internal Displacement 2006; Brookings Institution 2008; 2011). 
To facilitate this approach, a multi-sectorial and multi-agency team should 
determine each individual victim’s economic loss in the electoral crisis 
and carry out an evaluation for purposes of compensation (restitution, 
retribution or restoration). Governments, NGOs and other stakeholders 
need to initiate peace, cohesion and integration projects in the host 
communities. This approach ensures community resilience and a faster 
recovery and reconstruction process for the victims.
In situations where the Government has resettled IDPs on farms, there 
should be an accelerated plan to re-engage and provide them with capacity 
and empowerment for a sustainable livelihood. This may include providing 
them with tools, credit and new options of crop cultivation, poultry 
rearing and marketing. In the long run, they should provide them with 
legal documents for ownership of the houses and pieces of land allocated. 
Cohesion and integration agenda should be rolled out to ensure host 
communities do not label the resettled as IDPs.
7.2 Social support in reconstruction and recovery
Social support is an important aspect in IDPs’ reconstruction and recovery. 
In absence of external support from host communities or government, IDPs 
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form their own support system. Where IDPs make a decision to integrate 
with the host communities, they are able to adapt, absorb or transform 
much more quickly. The pyramid of social support affords many forms of 
social support such as providing direction, disposition, description, content 
and network (Tardy 1985:187–202). The foundation of social support is the 
social network: comprising immediate family, close friends, neighbours, 
co-workers, community and professionals.
In displacement, IDPs are able to create new social support mechanisms 
among themselves for the purpose of livelihood. These social support 
structures are closely knit as they have a clear understanding of each other. 
They have common values, mission and vision, and eventually they even 
create new norms.   
7.3 External actors’ support
In this study, non-state actors are stakeholders in the post-conf lict 
reconstruction and recovery. At the micro-level reconstruction and recovery 
processes, they need to actively involve communities in the design and the 
implementation of the projects. UNDP Kenya had a well programmed 
livelihood project (2009–2011). The activities within this project aimed to 
improve livelihood capacities and empower the IDPs (UNDP 2009; 2011c). 
To achieve progress, donors should consider more proposals from NGOs 
similar to the approach of the UNDP Kenya. The projects should run for a 
longer period of about five years or more to achieve effective impact. 
The peace process was driven by the AU with continual instruction and 
advice from western countries such as the US, UK, Germany and France. 
Because these countries were instrumental in peace negotiations, they 
must also appraise, evaluate and monitor the impact of the resettlement 
projects and, if necessary, fund the process to ensure an accelerated search 
of durable solutions for the IDPs.
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7.4 African Union mandate
The AU’s PCRD should continue with its current mandate, but enforcement 
mechanisms should be put in place to prevent post-election violence. 
The AU is a key stakeholder in Africa’s conf lict prevention and peace 
promotion. Although a mechanism for peer-review is in place, there has 
been no tangible impact on the way in which the system has managed to 
prevent violence (Khadiagala 2008; 2009; African Union 2009; 2010).
In the case of Kenya, the AU belatedly anticipated the post-election 
violence and at any rate failed to enforce systems to prevent it. Therefore 
the AU should consider expert missions – emplaced about two years to 
general elections – to study and make recommendations to countries going 
to elections. This would help in timeously monitoring and evaluating 
electoral systems and structures in the countries concerned, and in advising 
and enforcing where necessary. This would avoid a merely one-day event 
of monitoring general elections by AU observers, as currently is the case.
7.5 The empirical, theoretical and conceptual contribution
This study has attempted to focus on empirical, theoretical and conceptual 
aspects of reconstruction and recovery processes for IDPs after a post-
electoral conf lict.
In the fieldwork, post-election violence victims shared details about the 
loss of their economic (livelihood), physical (land), natural (heritage, 
culture) and social (friendship, neighbours) assets during the violence. The 
study shows how the concept of social support and community resilience 
has informed the post-conf lict reconstruction and recovery discourse, 
particularly in multi-ethnic communities. It shows that co-workers are the 
first call for social support during and after a crisis, and that IDPs have 
intentionally created IDP-based social support structures and systems to 
overcome their common adversity. 
The general expectation that IDPs are socio-economic vagrants due to 
the losses suffered has been found to be merely a perception, since it is 
clear that the victims have been making proactive and informed choices 
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about alternative sources of livelihood, based on the changing conditions 
to which they were adapting. The study finds reliance of casual labour 
and other menial jobs as the primary source of livelihood among IDPs. 
The IDPs are determined to overcome adversity.
Adaptive aspects of social capital are internally controlled by IDPs, while 
Government and non-state actors control absorptive and transformative 
aspects. As such, IDP communities rich in the three different aspects of 
social capital are able to regain functionality (bounce back) faster. This 
study may provide a baseline for future researchers interrogating how IDP 
communities could share their experiences in regard to aspects of social 
capital with other post-conf lict displaced communities located in many 
parts of the world.
With regard to the bouncing back of displaced communities, this study 
underscores the importance of such livelihood assets as land, food, security, 
jobs, businesses and household properties as enabling a community to 
transform, adapt or absorb new ways of life. Additionally, however, the 
capacity for more or less successful recovery is determined by the way 
in which the hosting community enables or constrains victims to adapt, 
absorb or transform during and after a crisis. On the one hand, an IDP 
community needs ownership of livelihood resource (land) and on the other 
hand, they need social support systems advancing the vision, mission, goals 
and objectives of becoming resilient. What this study found, is that the 
bigger the pool of livelihood assets and the faster the re-acquisition of lost 
assets or the acquisition of new assets, the further the post-conf lict victims 
stand on the pathway back to functionality.
There is a strong argument regarding the relationship between post-election 
violence and ethnicity. The summary of this argument is that post-election 
violence breaks down the community into closed hostile ethnically 
determined units. This study has found, however, that IDPs develop strong 
emergent norms, values and culture (bonding social capital) which become 
dominant among themselves and are not determined by ethnic affiliation. 
By sharing common problems in displacement, IDPs disregarded ethnic 
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affiliations and created unique forms of bonding social capital among 
themselves. The process of more successful recovery is determined by 
in-group solidarity, mobilisation and reciprocity supports. This creates 
strong in-group loyalty and comradeship and out-group antagonism. There 
is closure and density within the displaced population which ensures active 
resistance to infiltration by host communities. 
The important finding of this study is the possibility of IDPs mobilising 
new social networks based on the socio-economic and livelihood resources 
they have among themselves. This could eventually create a new society 
(community) complete with new traditions, culture, systems and 
structures. The opinion that the foundation of social support originates 
solely from victims’ social network, such as family and neighbours, is 
apparently not accurate. 
Indeed, the primary sources of social support among the displaced are 
the victims themselves. They share the pains of displacement, they share 
common characteristics, attitudes and behaviour; they develop new values 
and norms among themselves, based on their displaced world view. This 
new culture creates a new community distinct from the host community 
and different from the community as it might have previously existed. 
The new society/community emerging from displacement develops 
new forms of social capital. These communities/societies have different 
socio-economic and political attributes and characteristics from their 
pre-conf lict communities. Experiences in displacement shape their rules, 
values, norms, behaviour, attitudes and world view. I therefore submit that 
a new community created out of displacement is more resilient, and more 
connected by social support systems and structures which enable them to 
deal with future post-electoral conf licts. 
This emergent culture has unique community capacities – adaptive, 
absorptive and transformative – based on previous experiences. The 
community develops areas of collective action independent of the host 
communities: such as conf lict and risk reduction and management, 
community protection (food, money services, etc.), resource management 
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(water, land, etc.) and management of community goods and services 
(schools, health, etc.). These capacities evolve to become pervasive and 
even dominant in the geographic area occupied by the IDP community.
Additionally, this community/society has the capacity to inf luence host 
communities to adopt their new culture, values order, social systems, 
social structures and social networks. This study refers to this possibility 
as creating new social capital. Therefore, the longer IDPs occupy certain 
geographic areas, the greater the likelihood for them to inf luence 
the culture, social network, social values and interactions of the host 
community. The new community/society is devoid of ethnicity. Indeed, 
in the Kenyan context new worship systems, new agricultural practices, 
new market systems and micro-finance systems are taking shape in areas 
dominated by IDP resettlement. This concept is comparable with the 
structural and cultural inf luence an immigrant Muslim/Asian community 
can create whenever they settle in a new area. They develop strong loyalty, 
solidarity and comradeship bonds among themselves. They inf luence the 
language and economic systems of that geographic area. They are able in 
time to dominate existing social systems, structures and institutions.
7.6 Further research
The empirical, theoretical and conceptual issues, as well as the conclusions 
above, may provide scholars with new horizons of knowledge concerning 
social capital and community resilience as potent factors in the 
reconstruction and recovery processes of IDPs.
Based on the above conclusions, scholars need to investigate further the 
relationships between IDPs and refugees’ reconstruction and recovery 
processes. Additionally, future scholars should examine case studies of 
IDPs in non-war situations.
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